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By Robert Dover
The NSA, Snowden and the Media
As Michael Goodman and I tried to whimsically note in the sub-tit le of  our edited collection on intelligence
and the media – media needs intelligence and intelligence needs the media. The symbiosis of  this
relationship can be partly f ound in common expertise and practices (investigative zeal and tradecraf t
around weeding out hidden empirical detail), but also in the polit ical or normative f unction of  intelligence
agencies, namely to constrain and repel certain f orms of  polit ical discourse and activity deemed to be
abhorrent to the majority, but more particularly which is abhorrent to the established polit ical elites. So, at a
very basic level media outlets learn much f rom the activit ies of  intelligence agencies and the business they
engage in. Similarly the agencies have both used mainstream media to shape debates (the Cold War and the
War on Terror were notable examples), and to posit ion adversaries in a particular way (and this might apply
to every conf lict since the printing press was invented). But what I want to rehearse here are the particular
ways in which mainstream and parallel media sources – with a particular emphasis on the UK – have
coalesced and acted within the NSA/Snowden f urore, and the lessons we can learn f rom this.
My f irst lesson privileges the posit ion of  the mainstream press. Put simply, without the mainstream paid-f or
press there would have been no Snowden-NSA scandal. There is an important pre-caveat when ref erring to
the ‘Snowden material’, which is that virtually none of  the stated cache has been made publicly available,
much of  what we know has passed through the f ilter of  media organisations and as such has been
précised or synthesised, and that which has still to make it into the open will not do so in raw f orm. So,
there is an important distinction to be drawn between Wikileaks – f or example – which has published
redacted raw material, and overlaid analysis with it – and the Snowden material which has almost exclusively
been published in synthesised f orm. Snowden has stated that he did not seek to do damage to US national
interests, nor to cause revolution, but instead to provide the f ramework or opportunity through which the
public could make judgements about how this important area of  government activity should be f ramed, or
limited. This perhaps helps us to understand his dissemination strategy, but either way it is clear that
Snowden would not have been able to achieve his ends without the mainstream media to posit ion stories in
the way they have.
It is, however, both ironic and curious that a dissemination strategy premised on withholding the raw
material has arguably had a greater impact on the polit ical discourse than the various and transparent
Wikileaks stories have had, Cablegate  included. Part of  the causal explanation f or this is ‘our ’ connection
to the story: Cablegate was concerned with diplomatic cables between elites remote f rom ‘us’. Snowden’s
revelations were about ‘our ’ electronic communications and signals being interf ered with. The other part of
the equation sits in the way that this story existed in a reinf orcing ecosystem between the print, visual and
audio medias, governments (and note the strong use of  media messaging by Latin American and European
governments, save f or the UK) and international organisations such as the EU, along with extensive
commentary in independent and social media outlets. A vortex of  opinion was created in a way that never
happened with similar revelations around Cablegate, or in the late 90s and early 2000s around the
antecedent ECHELON programme. Traditional print media was the trigger movement f or the spontaneous
f ormation of  this ecosystem.
My second lesson demonstrates the power of  the geographically bound nature of  intelligence and law,
despite all the evidence to the contrary. Snowden and those who helped him with dissemination had
understood the lessons of  Wikileaks well: multi- jurisdictional and synchronised release of  inf ormation. This
is a risk-mitigation strategy, and one that has worked f lawlessly well on the occasions it has been used. It
removes the problem of  a single point of  f ailure and exposes a f law and tension in globalised
communications: that it is virtually impossible to stop communication in another territory. So, if  Snowden
has chosen only to publish in the UK, it would have been relatively easy to place an injunction on The
Guardian preventing publication, and then presumably D-Notice to prevent other UK-based outlets
commenting upon it. By releasing across multiple jurisdictions the genie was out of  the bottle bef ore any
single or multiple interested governments could intercede. Geographical binding was not just a problem f or
those who sought to contain or suppress this story (and to be clear: suppression was legally justif ied
because the core documents were classif ied), but is a wider problem f or intelligence activity and the
oversight and control of  it. The stories around rendition and torture, on the one hand, and around
surveillance of  f oreign nationals (and how one can receive inf ormation about a f oreign national f rom a
f oreign agency, which turns out to be a home national, but a legal leap of  f aith renders this acceptable) are
good evidence of  how globalisation has presented unparalleled opportunit ies and threats to the business
of  intelligence.
My f inal lesson is that of  the media as a regulator. In an exchange of  correspondence in the New York
Review of Books, The Guardian newspaper’s editor, Alan Rusbridger and the chair of  the UK oversight
committee, Sir Malcolm Rif kind MP, sparred over the role of  intelligence regulators. Rif kind’s core argument
was that Rusbridger was not suf f iciently au f ait with the material (and its context) to know whether release
was saf e or desirable. The sad truth f or Sir Malcolm and Parliament is that the Intelligence and Security
Committee and the laws governing intelligence activity in the UK, in particular, have f ailed to keep up with
the radical reorientation of  intelligence activity in an area of  ubiquitous electronic communication, and
cheap storage and electronic analytical capability. As such the ‘regulation by revelation’ motif  is one that will
remain visible in the UK (and to some degree the US) as a check and balance on relatively unrestrained
intelligence activity. We might ref rame this in the f ollowing way: does the public response indicate that this
issue is in the ‘public interest’? Almost certainly yes.  Was this issue raised and analysed by of f icial
oversight mechanisms? No.  So, we are lef t with competing and yet potentially complementary propositions
that the of f icial oversight mechanisms are not f it f or purpose, that they did not deem this activity to be
worthy of  attention, or that they were unaware of  the activity.
Parliament, backed separately by the courts, should be the appropriate institutions f or oversight and check
and balance. The media should be a sof t-balancer f or those exceptional moments of  abuse or acts which
are ultra vires. This particular balance went out of  kilter with Snowden’s revelations, and it will be important
f or it to return quickly, there having been appropriate actions taken by the UK Parliament. As a f ootnote to
this section it is worth mentioning that the Brit ish government has stood obdurately by the US
Administration, and senior Brit ish f igures have made bellicose noises about the impact that the revelations
will have on the security of  the US and UK. Senior intelligence f igures (current and retired) have repeatedly
condemned The Guardian in increasingly intemperate terms f or publishing what appears to be – to most lay
and expert readers – a set of  practices that are deserving of  public and polit ical scrutiny, and which had
been allowed to run loose f rom the intention of  legislators. For ref orm to occur in the UK there will only
need to be one conceptual shif t and realisation: the weakening of  communications security (by design)
potentially makes London a less desirable location as a global f inance hub. If  f inance f irms cannot
guarantee their communications they will f ind locations where they can – Germany would look like a good
location f or this, going f orward – and the pattern of  Brit ish polit ics is such that only this kind of  spur will
generate transf ormative change.
The tradit ional f orms of  media have historically been crit ical f riends (but good f riends nevertheless) to the
intelligence agencies. Since June 2013, this relationship has become a litt le antagonistic because of  the
Snowden materials and the rapid (and temporary) f ormation of  the self -perpetuating ecosystem as
described above. No matter where one sits on the detailing of  the privacy and intervention issues, it should
be relatively uncontested that the tradit ional media has played an essential role in the oversight of  this area
of  government activity, and in posit ioning the Snowden materials in such a way f or international impact. It is
a rare corrective to the dominant discourse of  the ubiquity of  social media.
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